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to. Enforcement will be in the normal way, essentially through the ICSID and New York
Convention routes, though the MAI will independently obligate MAI parties to provide
for the enforcement of the pecuniary awards. In this area, unlike state-state arbitration,
there is no need to worry about regulating responses to noncompliance, because these
awards are, hopefully, enforceable, although the MAI will do nothing to assure the
availability of sovereign-owned property for execution ofjudgments.
There are compromises that must be made in this negotiation, and a multilateral text
can never contain the preferred provisions of each party, but I believe we are on our way
to a regime that will be novel and state of the art in a number of ways and will provide a
sound multilateral basis for protecting and promoting international investment. And that
investment is an increasingly vital element in the development and well-being of the
world economy.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT CYCLES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES

by Amy L. Chua*
Alejandro Escobar, Daniel Price and David Small have been discussing how most
effectively to implement international investment regimes in emerging economies. I
would like to offer a different perspective: a historical perspective, which revisits the
question that Professor Vandevelde first raised, about the sustainability of foreign
investment regimes, or marketizing regimes more generally, throughout the developing
world. Please keep in mind that my remarks apply only to the developing world,
especially when I come to policy suggestions, because I suspect that some of my
copanelists will vehemently disagree with some of the things that I am going to say.
Let me begin by drawing your attention to a phenomenon in the developing world
that has been broadly overlooked. (For purposes of my talk, I'm going to limit myself to
Latin America and Southeast Asia.) The phenomenon I'm referring to is the existence of
a historical cycle in which developing countries in both Latin America and Southeast
Asia have oscillated between promarket regimes and anti-free-market regimes for as
long as they have been independent. Consider the history of Mexico. In Mexico,
independence was followed by a long period of economic liberalism: that is, private
property regimes generally accompanied by the vigorous promotion of capital investment
and, in particular, an openness to foreign capital and influence. This period of laissezfaire was followed by the Mexican Revolution, which culminated with President Ldzaro
Cirdenas's nationalization of the railroad and oil industries in the 1930s. Not surprisingly, foreign investment (one of Cdrdenas's main targets) declined dramatically during
this period; in some industries, foreign investment was eliminated altogether.
This revolutionary period was followed by another period of free enterprise, in
which many of the industries previously nationalized-for example, the petroleum and
sulphur industries-were reprivatized, and foreign investment was once again vigorously
courted. This was followed by another round of nationalization and statist policies under
which key industries were again closed off to foreigners, and then by the current period
of economic liberalization in Mexico, in which foreign investment laws are again being
rapidly amended to bring foreign capital back into the same key sectors: for example,
petroleum, mining, communications, transportation and utilities.
A similar pattern of market policies followed by backlash against the market holds
throughout Latin America, with almost no exceptions, and in Southeast Asia as well,
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although in Southeast Asia one sees fewer oscillations, because the countries there
achieved independence much later than the countries of Latin America. If anyone is
interested in the empirical support for this claim of cyclicality, I can refer you to an
article of mine in the ColumbiaLaw Review.1
Recognizing this cyclicality raises a set of questions that are different from the ones
that my copanelists have been focusing on: Specifically, why has this happened in the
past? Are things different today? Professor Vandevelde mentioned the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the excellent track record of the East Asian countries. Have the
relevant conditions, both internal to developing countries and international, changed
sufficiently? Or are today's liberalized foreign-investment regimes subject to the same
kind of backlash that has occurred so many times before?
I would like now to address these questions. First, why have there been cycles in
Latin America and Southeast Asia? That is, what are the pressures that have repeatedly
caused developing countries to move away from the free market, especially since
nationalization and state-interventionist policies have historically, and repeatedly, been
such failures (under any number of economic indicators)? Part of the answer has to do
with something I am sure you are all aware of. That is, in the past, free-market, proforeigner regimes in the developing world repeatedly benefited the foreign investors far
more than the local populations. In fact, in the past, during periods of economic
liberalization, the vast majority of Mexicans, or Peruvians, or Indonesians or Matays
experienced little or no benefit from a liberalized market. As a result, politicians (often
themselves from the elite classes) found that they could whip up populist support for
themselves by playing on these antiforeigner sentiments. And in fact, in case after case,
leaders in the developing world came to power on explicitly antiforeigner, antiimperialist, anti-free-market platforms. This was true of Juan Per6n in Argentina,
Getfilio Vargas in Brazil, Josd Batlle y Ord6fiez in Uruguay, Salvador Allende in Chile,
Sukarno in Indonesia and U Nu in Burma (now Myanmar), among others.
But that is only part of the explanation. There is another equally important dynamic
going on that is internal to developing countries. Free-market policies in the developing
world (including liberalized foreign-investment regimes) have tended to benefit
disproportionately not just Western foreigners but certain resented internalforeigners
(this is the term I am going to use for economically dominant ethnic minorities in these
countries), vis-;-vis the rest of the population.
Who are these internal foreigners? In Southeast Asia I'm referring principally to the
Chinese. In countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and
Vietnam, during free-market periods the Chinese minority, the so-called "Jews of the
Orient," who make up much of the commercial class in these countries, prosper
disproportionately. In stark contrast, the predominantly rural "indigenous" majorities in
these countries basically remain impoverished, experiencing little or no benefit from the
free market. The Chinese are not the only entrepreneurial minority in Southeast Asia. In
Myanmar (as well as East Africa and the Caribbean), historically it was the very small
Indian minority who tended to become economically dominant under free-market
conditions, relative to the indigenous majority. In Sri Lanka it was the Tamil minority, as
opposed to the Sinhalese.
Accordingly, in Southeast Asia, these movements against the free market-in favor
of restrictive investment policies, nationalization and redistribution-historically have
been far more expressions of ethnic nationalism than of Marxism or socialism. Unlike
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the experience of the former Soviet Union or China, during these antimarket periods in
Southeast Asia there has really never been an attempt to eliminate private property or to
level the class structure (Vietnam is the exception). Rather, in these countries, antimarket
movements have principally been attempts by certain "indigenous" groups to reclaim
resources and economic power from other groups identified as "foreigners." And again
these foreigners include not only Western "imperialist" foreigners but also these
"foreigners within."
For example, in Indonesia, President Sukamo's sweeping nationalizations in the
1950s and 1960s were directed not just at the Dutch but also (indeed, most viciously) at
the country's Chinese minority. In fact, through nationalization and other measures of
economic nationalism, Sukamo successfully "indigenized" Indonesia's financial sector,
its mining sector and most of the modem industrial sectors-all of which had been
formerly dominated by the Chinese minority, along with the Europeans.
Similarly, in Burma, General Ne Win's nationalization of over 15,000 enterprises in
the 1960s and 1970s expressly targeted not just Western but Indian proprietors (many of
whose families had lived for generations in Burma and many of whom considered
themselves Burmese). Those nationalizations were accompanied by extensive violence
against the Indian minority.
These examples are typical. If one looks at history, it is clear that ethnic nationalism-not socialism-has repeatedly been the driving force behind anti-free-market
movements in Southeast Asia. This is important because it means the fact that the Soviet
Union has collapsed-and that socialism has been "discredited"-does not ensure the
sustainability of today's market regimes.
Let me turn now to Latin America. The social structure in Latin America is quite
different from that in Southeast Asia, in at least three salient ways. First, in Latin
America, because of historically high rates of racial intermarriage (as well as concubinage and polygyny), one tends not to find discrete ethnic groups living and working
separately from each other (as, for example, the Malays, Chinese and Indians do in
Malaysia). Second, whereas in Southeast Asia, economic and political power are
divorced-the "indigenous" majority holds political power, while an ethnic minority
holds economic power-in Latin America political and economic power have historically
been concentrated in the same hands. Third, as a result of the first two factors,
nationalization and antimarket movements in Latin America have typically assumed an
antielitist cast that gives them a much more explicit dimension of class conflict than is
present in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, I think that what has been happening in Latin America is directly
analogous to the dynamic in Southeast Asia. It is true that ethnic and racial lines in Latin
America are much less starkly drawn than in Southeast Asia. But there exists in Latin
America what sociologists have long recognized as a pigmentocracy: a spectrum with
taller, lighter-skinned, Spanish-blooded aristocrats at one end; shorter, darker, Indianblooded masses at the other end; and a good deal of "passing" between. 2
As a result, there's a significant degree of overlap between class conflict in Latin
America and ethnicity. In fact, just as in Southeast Asia, during periods of free enterprise
or economic liberalism a small, ethnically definable group--I am talking about the
Spanish-blooded, Europeanized, Caucasian elite-prospers disproportionately. And
again, during periods of nationalization and antimarket sentiment, this group comes to be
depicted as a "foreigner within," and nationalizations are directed not just at Western
foreigners, but at this internal foreigner as well.
2 See MAGNus MORNER, RACE MXTURE IN THE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 54 (1967).
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Indeed, if you look at Latin American history, nationalization movements have
repeatedly presented themselves in just such ethnically tinged, nationalist terms. For
instance, the revolutionary movement in Mexico at the beginning of this century was an
explicitly nationalist movement, and it had an explicitly ethnic dimension: Indian blood
was glorified as the mark of a true Mexican. Accordingly, Cdrdenas's nationalizations
targeted not just Yankees up north but internal foreigners as well: the white
landowners
3
with their links to foreign capital and their European cultural pretensions.
Similarly, in Peru and Bolivia, nationalization programs early in this century were
accompanied by slogans such as, "The only true Peru is Indian Peru" and "The land to
the Indians, the mines to the state.' 4 Indeed, in every Latin American country, the idea of
an internal foreigner has been
5 a powerful organizing, mobilizing force for politicians
championing nationalization.
To summarize, in country after country in Southeast Asia and Latin America, liberal,
market-oriented policies have distributed their benefits disproportionately to Western
foreigners and to certain resented internal foreigners; as a result, these market policies
have fueled backlash reactions culminating in the return of xenophobic, antiliberal
economic programs.
To return to the present, the real question then is whether there is a danger that this
cycle could happen again. I think the answer is clearly yes. Throughout Latin America
and Southeast Asia, one already sees resentment starting to form against both the
Western foreigner and the internal ethnic foreigner. In Indonesia, for example, where the
Chinese make up less than 5 percent of the population but control "an estimated 70
percent of the country's private domestic capital," the Minister of Technology has
publicly advocated "reclaiming" the country's industry and technology from the Chinese6
minority; many think that Minister Habibie will eventually succeed Suharto as President.
In fact, just a few days ago the front page of the New York Times reported riots against
the economically dominant Chinese. Similarly, in Mexico, a well-known columnist has
recently charged that privatization "has made multimillionaires of 13 families," while the
rest of Mexico, some 80 million people, continues to live in poverty. If one looks, the
warning signs are there.
The solution is certainly not to scrap the market-there is no question that the
market and foreign capital will have to be part of any developing country's long-term
solution. Rather, the point is that today's foreign investment treaties and marketization
programs, to be effective, to last, to be sustainable, are going to have to focus in a way
they never have on the problems of nationalism and ethnicity in the developing world.
As to specific policy suggestions, ideally the concrete steps to be taken would be the
result of sophisticated bargaining by governments and private firms, with the assistance
of economists and international organizations. But what I want to do right now is to
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throw out some very general suggestions that could be building blocks or discussion
points in addressing the kinds of problems I've described.
First, and I am sure Mr. Price and Mr. Small will disagree, in developing countries
some foreign ownership restrictions may well make sense in certain sectors, for example,
highly sensitive, high-profile sectors, such as oil in Mexico, teak in Myanmar and silver
in Peru. These are sectors with symbolic value, sectors with a history of nationalization
and renationalization. Foreign investors and the international community should realize
that, in the long run, it will be the presence of indigenous owners along with the foreign
owners that safeguards the sustainability of liberal investment regimes.
Second, perhaps foreign investment treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, should
address in an effective way the possibility of holding Western investors to higher
environmental and labor standards. For example, when 8,000 Costa Rican workers are
sterilized because U.S. companies such as Chiquita and Dow Chemical used chemicals
that were banned in the United States, you have a recipe for backlash against foreign
investment!
Finally, I want to address performance requirements. Again, in the context of developing countries, states with emerging economies should think seriously about requiring
major foreign investors to undertake projects intended to benefit the general population. I
worked on the privatization of Tel6fonos de M6xico (Telmex), Mexico's national
telephone company, for four years, representing the Mexican Government. Under
Mexico's telecommunications laws the new owners of Telmex (who include Southwestern Bell) must comply with a detailed operating concession. The concession in turn
requires Telmex to expand and modernize the telephone system in ways specifically
intended to benefit Mexican consumers. In particular, Southwestern Bell is required to
bring telephone service to sparsely populated rural areas.9 (This is something that was
done in the United States in the 1930s.) Along these lines, governments of developing
countries could perhaps work with economists to come up with ways to require foreign
investors to put in water purification plants, hospitals or much-needed infrastructure, with
a view to long-term efficiency and development.
Other methods would be appropriate for trying to handle the even more difficult
problem of market-triggered backlash against the internal ethnic foreigner. Employee
participation schemes, intended to disperse the benefits of the market, have been
successful enough in Chile (the Endesa privatization) and in the United States (the United
Airlines Employee Stock Ownership Plan) to warrant attention to such strategies. Again,
for lack of time, I refer you to my Columbia Law Review article.' 0
The problem, of course, with all these suggestions is that they entail short-run
efficiency costs; in the short run, they make it marginally less desirable for foreign
investors to invest in emerging economies. But the international community as well as
foreign investors should realize that such short-term costs may be necessary to ensure the
long-term stability of an effective international investment regime.
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